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Matching Political Contributions 
Spencer Overton† 
  INTRODUCTION   
Traditional public financing of campaigns is in trouble. 
Successful candidates have increasingly rejected public financ-
ing because it provides inadequate funding and limits candi-
date spending.1 In an attempt to revive the idea, several states 
and localities adopted provisions that gave additional “equaliz-
ing funds” to publicly financed candidates so they could remain 
competitive with privately financed opponents.2 In June 2011, 
however, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down Arizona’s ver-
sion of this provision,3 reasoning that it discouraged the speech 
of privately financed candidates.4 
 
†  Professor of Law, The George Washington University Law School. Mi-
chael Abramowicz, Eleanor Brown, Anupam Chander, Tom Colby, Chris 
Edley, Roger Fairfax, Heather Gerken, Rick Hasen, Sam Issacharoff, Larry 
Lessig, Amy Loprest, Michael Malbin, Bill Marshall, Mimi Marziani, Nick 
Nyhart, Dan Ortiz, Rick Pildes, Adam Skaggs, Peter Smith, Benjamin Spen-
cer, Dan Tokaji, Amanda Tyler, Adam Winkler, and Fane Wolfer provided 
helpful comments that allowed me to develop this Article. Rachel Applestein, 
Benjamin Kapnik, and Stephanie Rodriguez contributed invaluable research 
assistance. Copyright © 2012 by Spencer Overton. 
 1. See infra text accompanying notes 45–50 (discussing how candidates 
have increasingly opted out of the presidential public financing system). 
 2. See infra note 52 and accompanying text (discussing examples of these 
provisions). 
 3. Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 
2806, 2829 (2011). The author edited and signed onto an amicus brief in Ari-
zona Free Enterprise that argued the Court should allow state and local inno-
vation with tools like supplemental funding triggers to improve campaign fi-
nance laws. See Brief for Constitutional and Election Law Professors as Amici 
Curiae Supporting Respondents, Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC 
v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806 (2011) (Nos. 10-238, 10-239), 2011 WL 686402 
[hereinafter Brief for Professors].  
 4. See Ariz. Free Enter., 131 S. Ct. at 2813 (holding the Arizona law at 
issue violative of the First Amendment). 
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The Court’s decision in Arizona Free Enterprise v. Bennett 
deals a significant blow to traditional public financing.5 But ra-
ther than give up the fight, reformers should seize the decision 
as an opportunity to transform their entire approach. Public fi-
nancing should no longer aim to purge private money from poli-
tics. Instead, it should encourage as many private citizens as 
possible to participate in financing politics. Increased participa-
tion makes government more accountable and responsive to the 
people as a whole, and it facilitates individual autonomy and 
self-governance.6 Just as civic norms encourage all citizens to 
vote,7 a key goal of public financing should be to encourage eve-
ryone to make a financial contribution to a political candidate 
of his or her choice.  
Conventional reformers and press accounts suggest that 
“there is too much money in politics”8—but they are wrong. The 
real problem is that the money comes from too few people. 
While 64% of eligible Americans voted in the November 2008 
election, only 10% typically give to political campaigns, and less 
than 0.5% are responsible for the bulk of the money that politi-
cians collect from individual contributors.9 
Unfortunately, conventional public financing has made this 
problem worse by suppressing participation. Had Barack 
Obama participated in the public financing program for the 
2008 general election, for example, his campaign would not 
have been able to collect even a $5 contribution from a donor, 
and he would not have attracted an unprecedented 2.7 million 
small donors.10 Perhaps more important, Obama also would 
have sacrificed thousands of volunteer organizers who engaged 
in voter registration, door-to-door canvassing, and phone bank-
ing, as studies show donating even small amounts develops 
bonds to a movement that lead to other forms of grassroots  
engagement.11 
 
 5. While the Court in Arizona Free Enterprise did not invalidate all tra-
ditional public financing programs, its decision made most traditional public 
financing schemes unworkable. See infra notes 53–58 and accompanying text. 
 6. See infra text accompanying notes 59–61. 
 7. See id. 
 8. See, e.g., George F. Will, ‘Campaign Reform’ Means ‘Shut Up!’, N.Y. 
POST, Feb. 3, 2012, http://www.nypost.com/p/news/opinion/opedcolumnists/ 
campaign_reform_means_shut_up_BlibKnKWSaIdQYGy7fg2TL. 
 9. See infra notes 60–61 and accompanying text. 
 10. See infra note 65 and accompanying text. 
 11. See infra note 71 and accompanying text. 
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This Article navigates this new legal and political order 
and maps out the future of public financing. The way forward 
requires an overhaul of public financing that spurs greater par-
ticipation by the public at large. 
Specifically, the answer lies in a system that gives a multi-
ple match to donor contributions. Rather than continuing to 
give each candidate a flat grant of $100,000, for example, public 
financing systems should give six-to-one multiple matching 
funds on the first $200 of a contribution. This would make a 
$200 contribution worth $1400 to a candidate. 
Multiple matching funds reflect a philosophical shift about 
the role of money in politics. Money is not an “evil,” but should 
be embraced as a tool to make government accountable to more 
people. Public financing should not “level the playing field”12 
among candidates, but should reward candidates who mobilize 
more supporters. Reformers need to spend less energy on “get-
ting big money out of campaigns” and more on “getting the peo-
ple back in” to those very same campaigns.13 
Multiple matching funds address the core challenge to fi-
nancial political participation—a lack of income.14 Financial 
constraints determine who gives money.15 Individuals with 
family incomes over $100,000 represented 11.1% of the popula-
tion in 2004, cast 14.9% of the votes, and were responsible for 
approximately 80% of political contributions over $200.16 
Participation rates are also low because candidates face 
lower transaction costs in mobilizing larger contributions from 
a narrow group of higher-income Americans.17 Studies show 
that mobilization is a major factor in financial participation 
(people asked to give are much more likely to do so), and fund-
raisers find that they can raise more money by targeting larger 
contributors.18 “Why should I call ten people and ask for $100 
each,” many candidates and fundraisers ask, “when it takes me 
less time to call one person and ask for $1000?”19 
 
 12. See Ariz. Free Enter., 131 S. Ct. at 2825 (rejecting a “state interest in 
‘leveling the playing field’”). 
 13. David Donnelly, We Need More Citizen Participation, BOS. REV., 
Sept.–Oct. 2010, http://www.bostonreview.net/BR35.5/donnelly.php. 
 14. See infra note 78 and accompanying text. 
 15. See infra note 79 and accompanying text. 
 16. See infra notes 80–82 and accompanying text.  
 17. See infra text accompanying notes 85–88. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
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Against this accepted wisdom, however, multiple matching 
programs make candidates more willing to engage more Ameri-
cans and expand participation. For example, while candidates 
in California (which lacks multiple matching funds) collect only 
5% of their money from contributors who give $250 or less,20 
candidates in New York City (the only American jurisdiction 
with six-to-one multiple matching funds) collect over half of 
their money from contributors who give $250 or less.21 Seven 
times more New York City residents contributed to city races 
(which have multiple matching funds) than contributed to state 
races (which lack multiple matching funds).22 Data presented 
for the first time here show that six-to-one multiple matching 
funds stimulate participation much more effectively than a 
basic one-to-one match23 and a handful of jurisdictions have 
employed such multiple matching funds for decades.24 
Nonetheless, critics will still argue that private markets 
alone should finance politics.25 They are wrong. Providing the 
basic framework for citizen participation through multiple 
matching funds is a proper government function, as evidenced 
by the other tools government uses to facilitate democratic par-
ticipation. For example, the state traditionally provides a plat-
form to participate by supplying voter registration services, ac-
cessible polling places, ballots, and other tools.26 Multiple 
matching funds are no different. Indeed, multiple matching of 
contributions is not “welfare for politicians” that boosts candi-
dates with weak fundraising skills, as some have labeled con-
ventional public financing. Instead, multiple matching funds 
facilitate the majority’s maxim in Citizens United v. FEC that 
money is a form of speech and therefore an important tool to 
“hold officials accountable to the people.”27 Those who insist 
that private money alone should finance politics elevate their 
mechanical aversion to government over a commitment to ex-
pand liberty.  
 
 20. See infra note 42 ( listing states, including California, that provide 
partial matching payments). 
 21. See infra note 109 and accompanying text.  
 22. See infra note 78 and accompanying text. 
 23. See discussion infra Part III. 
 24. See id. 
 25. See discussion infra Part II.B (discussing arguments from market-
oriented critics against public financing of campaigns). 
 26. See infra text accompanying notes 96–99. 
 27. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 898 (2010). 
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In facilitating participation, a multiple matching program 
also diversifies a candidate’s support so that she is less behold-
en to a narrow group of large donors, thereby reducing the po-
tential for corruption.28 Such a program would represent less 
than 0.07% of government spending and would deliver a return 
on investment several times higher by helping to prevent cor-
ruption in a political process that collects and spends trillions 
of dollars each year.29 
Multiple matching programs also avoid significant prob-
lems faced by traditional public financing, including funds be-
ing rejected by strong candidates and large subsidies being 
wasted on candidates with little public support.30 Further, mul-
tiple matching programs do not burden speech, and they com-
ply with the Court’s campaign finance decisions.31 
This is a critical moment for campaign finance. Within two 
terms, the Roberts Court struck down corporate spending re-
strictions and rendered traditional public financing schemes 
obsolete.32 Citizens United also led to the emergence of inde-
pendent expenditure-only committees that may accept unlim-
ited contributions—or “superPACs”—which increased candi-
dates’ incentives to find a few wealthy investors to fund these 
outside groups with multimillion-dollar contributions.33 No-
vember 2012 will be the first general election in which presi-
dential candidates from both major parties reject public financ-
ing since the inception of the program. If existing programs are 
 
 28. See infra text accompanying notes 118–21. 
 29. See infra text accompanying notes 137–51 (discussing cost-benefit 
analyses of various matching programs). 
 30. See infra text accompanying notes 45–52. 
 31. See discussion infra Part III.C. 
 32. Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 
2806, 2812 (2011) (invalidating the trigger provision of public financing); Citi-
zens United, 130 S. Ct. at 929 (invalidating restrictions on corporate spending 
on politics); see also Speechnow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686, 696 (D.C. Cir. 2010) 
(holding that independent expenditure political committees could accept un-
limited contributions from individuals, following the holding of Citizens Unit-
ed); FEC Advisory Op. 2010-11, available at http://saos.nictusa.com/saos/ 
searchao?SUBMIT=ao&AO=3069 (stating that unions and corporations could 
give unlimited contributions to such independent expenditure committees). 
 33. See Speechnow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686, 696 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Memo-
randum from Thomasenia P. Duncan, General Counsel, FEC, et al. to the FEC 
(July 21, 2010), available at http://www.fec.gov/agenda/2010/ mtgdoc1042.pdf. 
Outside groups have spent $45,754,221 in the 2012 Republican primary race 
compared to $43,423,823 from the candidates. See Outside Spending: 2012 
Presidential Race, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, http://www.opensecrets. 
org/races/indexp.php?cycle=2012&id=PRES ( last visited Feb. 12, 2012). 
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not revamped soon, public financing may be off the public’s ra-
dar for decades, as budget deficits make antiquated public fi-
nancing programs ripe targets for spending cuts. At the same 
time, technology is removing barriers to participation—a 
movement reflected by the rise of the small dollar donor. With 
so much in flux, federal, state, and local lawmakers are looking 
for guidance. This Article provides the direction that public fi-
nancing should now take. 
Part I of this Article chronicles the demise of public financ-
ing in the United States. Part II introduces a participatory the-
ory to public financing, and explains why it is superior to the 
approaches of both conventional public financing advocates who 
seek to purge private money from politics and libertarians who 
would rely exclusively on private economic markets. Part III de-
tails the implementation of this new approach by outlining and 
analyzing a multiple match proposal for citizen contributions.  
I.  THE DEMISE OF CONVENTIONAL PUBLIC FINANCING   
In public financing systems, candidates receive cash grants 
for campaigning from the public treasury.34 Generally, candi-
dates qualify for public funds by raising a threshold amount of 
money from a minimum number of donors or by winning a par-
ty nomination.35 While all public funding systems require that 
participating candidates limit their campaign spending,36 the 
 
 34. Candidates or parties may receive other forms of public subsidies, 
such as the franking privilege, bulk mailing rates, rebates or tax credits to 
contributors, political conventions grants, and television and radio subsidies. 
See Richard Briffault, Public Funding and Democratic Elections, 148 U. PA. L. 
REV. 563, 566–68 (1999) (discussing the forms of public subsidies available to 
political candidates). 
 35. In “Clean Elections” states, candidates qualify for grants by raising a 
threshold number of small private contributions and then agreeing to refrain 
from additional private fundraising. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 16-946, 
16-950 (2011) (requiring candidates to raise different numbers of $5 donations 
to qualify for funding); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 9-702, 9-704 (2011) (requiring 
candidates to raise $250,000 in contributions no greater than $100); ME. REV. 
STAT. tit. 21, §§ 1122, 1125 (2011) (requiring different numbers of $5 dona-
tions depending on position sought); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-19A-2, 1-19A-4 
(2011) (requiring $5 contributions from a percentage of the state population); 
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 163-278.62, 163-278.64 (2011) (requiring 350 contribu-
tions, each between $10 and $500). Presidential primary candidates qualify for 
public funds by raising $5000 from donors in at least twenty states. See 26 
U.S.C. § 9033(b) (2006). In addition, only the first $250 of each contribution is 
counted. See id. 
 36. See Briffault, supra note 34, at 568 (“All existing systems for providing 
public funds to candidates require those who accept public funds to agree to 
accept limits on their campaign spending.”); see also, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. 
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Court has interpreted the Constitution as forbidding such lim-
its on candidates who choose not to participate.37 
Jurisdictions allocate public funds in different ways.38 Full 
flat-grant financing jurisdictions give candidates flat lump-sum 
grants equal to those received by other participating candi-
dates, and prohibit participating candidates from spending any 
private money. Partial flat-grant financing jurisdictions often 
give candidates flat lump-sum grants equal to the amounts giv-
en to other participating candidates, but allow them to collect 
private money.39 
Other jurisdictions match donor contributions. Most of the-
se systems give candidates a modest match for private contri-
butions in gubernatorial (and sometimes other statewide) elec-
tions. For example, in a jurisdiction that provides a one-to-one 
match for the first $250 of a private contribution, a private 
$250 contribution is worth $500 to a candidate. Two cities offer 
significant multiple match programs. New York City, for exam-
ple, matches the first $175 of a political contribution at a six-to-
one ratio (e.g., a $150 contribution is worth $1050 to a  
candidate).40 
 
ANN. §§ 16-941, 16-947 (2011); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 9-702 (2011); FLA. STAT. 
§ 106.33 (2011); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 11-423, 11-428 (2011); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 
21-A, § 1125(9) (2011); MD. CODE ANN., ELEC. LAW § 15-105 (2011); MASS. 
GEN. LAWS ch. 55C,§ 1A (2011); MICH. COMP. LAWS§ 169.267 (2011); MINN. 
STAT.§ 10A.25 (2010); NEB. REV. STAT. § 32-1604 (2011); N.J. STAT. ANN. 
§ 19:44A-7 (West 2011); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 1-19A-3 (2011); N.C. GEN. STAT. 
§ 163-278.64 (2011); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 17-25-19 (2011); VT. STAT. ANN. tit., 17 
§ 2853 (2011); WIS. STAT. § 11.50 (2011). 
 37. Although spending limits applied to all candidates are unconstitution-
al, imposing spending limits on candidates as a condition of accepting public 
funds is permissible. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 58–59, 107–08 (1976) (per 
curiam); see also R. SAM GARRETT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33814, PUBLIC 
FINANCING OF CONGRESSIONAL CAMPAIGNS: OVERVIEW AND ANALYSIS 4 (2011) 
(“[P]ublic financing is attractive to some because it is one of the few constitu-
tional ways to limit campaign spending . . . .”).  
 38. For a summary of state and local public financing laws, see JESSICA A. 
LEVINSON & SMITH LONG, CTR. FOR GOVERNMENTAL STUDIES, MAPPING PUB-
LIC FINANCING IN AMERICAN ELECTIONS 5 (2009); JESSICA A. LEVINSON, CTR. 
FOR GOVERNMENTAL STUDIES, STATE PUBLIC FINANCING CHARTS 2 (2009). 
 39. Partial public financing in Nebraska becomes available only if one 
candidate adheres to spending limits while the other does not (the candidate 
complying with limits is given public money). GARRETT, supra note 37, at 37. 
This may violate the holding of Arizona Free Enterprise.  
 40. N.Y.C., N.Y. ADMIN. CODE §§ 3-703, 3-705 (2010). San Francisco offers 
candidates a four-to-one match for the first $100,000 in contributions of up to 
$500 to the candidate after the candidate qualifies for public matching funds. 
S.F., CAL., CAMPAIGN & GOVERNMENTAL CONDUCT CODE §§ 1.104, 1.144 
(2010). Members of Congress have recently introduced multiple matching for 
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In 2011, five states provided full public financing,41 four 
states provided partial public financing in the form of lump 
sum payments,42 and seven states provided a modest match for 
 
Congressional campaigns. See Fair Elections Now Act, H.R. 1826, 111th Cong. 
(2009) (providing a four-to-one match on contributions of $100 or less).  
 41. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-950 (2011); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 9-704 
(2011); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 21, § 1125 (2011); N.M. STAT. ANN.§ 1-19A-4 (2011); 
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-278.64 (2011); LEVINSON & LONG, supra note 38, at 4 
(indicating that the states of Arizona, Connecticut, Maine, New Mexico, and 
North Carolina and the cities of Albuquerque and Portland provide full “clean 
elections” public financing to qualified candidates running for some offices). 
 42. MINN. STAT.§ 10A.31 (20110); NEB. REV. STAT. § 32-1606 (2011) (man-
dating financing in set amounts for candidates for a variety of positions); VT. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2855 (2011) (implementing block financing for governor 
and lieutenant governor); WIS. STAT. § 11.50 (2011) (mandating funding split 
between political positions, and then apportioned to each eligible candidate 
running for that position); LEVINSON & LONG, supra note 37, at 5 (indicating 
that the states of Florida, Hawaii, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Min-
nesota, Nebraska, New Jersey, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Wisconsin; the 
county of Miami-Dade; and the cities of Austin, Boulder, New Haven, New 
York City, Tucson, and several California cities (Long Beach, Los Angeles, 
Oakland, Richmond, Sacramento, and San Francisco) provide partial public 
financing—in which Levinson and Long include matching funds—for some of-
fices to candidates who qualify). Iowa, Ohio, and Utah do not offer public fi-
nancing to candidates but offer it to parties (Rhode Island offers it to both par-
ties and candidates). IOWA CODE § 68A.605 (2011); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 3517.18 (LexisNexis 2011); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 44-30-2 (2011); UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 59-10-1312 (LexisNexis 2011). Arkansas, Oregon and Virginia do not 
offer public financing to candidates or parties, but offer a tax credit to individ-
uals who make political contributions (Arizona, Minnesota, Ohio, and Rhode 
Island offer both tax credits and public financing grants to either parties or 
candidates). ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-954 (2011) (allowing $5 tax credit for 
donation directed to a specific party, or up to $500 tax credit for donation to 
public funding of elections that cannot be directed); ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-6-222 
(2011) (allowing up to a $50 credit for an individual return); MINN. STAT. 
§ 290.06 (2011) (allowing a tax credit of up to $50 per individual for donation 
to political party or candidate); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3517.18 (LexisNexis 
2011) (offering tax credit of up to $50 for donation to candidate); OR. REV. 
STAT. § 316.102 (2009) (same); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 44-30-2 (2011) (providing for 
up to $5 tax credit per individual for donation to public financing, up to $2 of 
which can be directed to a specific political party); VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-344.3 
(2011) (allowing tax refund for up to a $25 contribution to a political party). In 
all, twenty-two states currently offer some form of tax credit for political con-
tributions and/or full or partial public financing to candidates and/or parties. 
A majority of democracies throughout the world have “legal provisions” for 
some form of public financing of campaigns. Magnus Öhman, Practical Solu-
tions for the Public Funding of Political Parties and Election Campaigns, in 
POLITICAL FINANCE REGULATION: THE GLOBAL EXPERIENCE 25, 60 (Magnus 
Öhman & Hani Zainulbhai eds., 2009) (suggesting that over half of the 183 
United Nations member states that have a “de jure multi-party system” have 
“legal provisions” for public funding to political parties). 
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private contributions.43 The federal government provided major 
party presidential candidates full public financing for the gen-
eral election and a modest one-to-one match on the first $250 of 
a contribution for primary elections.44 
Recently, stronger candidates have opted out of the presi-
dential public financing system because of inadequate funding 
and low spending limits imposed on participants. All winning 
presidential candidates used the public financing system from 
its inception in 1976 until 1996.45 In 2000 and 2004, however, 
George W. Bush opted out of the primary public financing sys-
tem.46 In 2008, Barack Obama opted out of both primary and 
general election public financing.47 Had Obama accepted public 
financing he would have received $105.8 million in public 
funds48 and been limited to spending $126.15 million,49 where-
as by opting out he was able to raise $745.7 million.50 
Anticipating an opt-out problem in their state and local 
elections, in the 1990s and early 2000s several states and local-
ities adopted a “trigger” provision to entice candidates to accept 
 
 43. Seven states and the presidential primary fund utilize matching con-
tributions. I.R.C.§ 9034 (2006); FLA. STAT. § 106.35(2) (2008) (providing a two-
to-one match for first $250); HAW. REV. STAT. § 11-429 (2011) (providing a one-
to-one match); MASS. GEN. LAWS, ch. 55C, §§ 1, 5 (2011) (providing a one-to-
one match under $250); MD. CODE ANN., ELEC. LAW § 15-106 (2011) (providing 
a limited one-to-one match for gubernatorial candidates in the primary); 
MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 169.212(1), 169.264(1) (2005) (providing a two-to-one 
match for contributions less than $100 in primary for participating gubernato-
rial candidates); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:44A-33 (West 2009) (providing a two-to-
one match on the first $1500 for gubernatorial candidates); R.I. GEN. LAWS 
§ 17-25-19 (2009) (providing a two-to-one match for contributions less than 
$500 and a one-to-one match for contributions above $500).  
 44. See I.R.C. §§ 9034(a), 9037 (2006) (providing a one-to-one match on 
first $250). 
 45. Eric M. Appleman, Democracy in Action, Presidential Campaign Fi-
nance, GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIV., http://www.gwu.edu/~action/2008/presfin08 
.html ( last visited Aug. 29, 2011). 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Presidential Spending Limits for 2008, FEC, http://www.fec.gov/pages/ 
brochures/pubfund_limits_2008.shtml ( last visited Aug. 25, 2011); Quick An-
swers to Public Funding Questions, FEC, http://www.fec.gov/ans/answers_ 
public_funding.shtml#howmuchmoneydotheyget ( last visited Aug. 26, 2011). 
 49. Presidential Spending Limits for 2008, supra note 48. 
 50. Jonathan D. Salant, Watergate-Era Public Finance System Faces 
Budget Ax, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 26, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011 
-01-26/watergate-era-finance-system-for-presidential-races-faces-house-budget 
-ax.html. 
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public money.51 These provisions increased spending limits and 
gave additional public funds to a publicly financed candidate 
when an opposing privately financed candidate and/or outside 
group received or spent funds above a designated amount (often 
the spending limit imposed upon the publicly financed  
candidate).52 
In Arizona Free Enterprise v. Bennett, a five-Justice major-
ity invalidated Arizona’s trigger provision, concluding that it 
violated the First Amendment.53 The Court determined that 
the trigger burdened the speech of privately financed candi-
dates and independent groups, as these entities knew that 
spending over a set amount would trigger government-
sponsored speech opposing their interests.54 The Court found 
that the drafters of the trigger intended to equalize speech be-
tween candidates, and determined that this rationale did not 
constitute a compelling state interest that justified burdening 
speech.55 
Justice Elena Kagan, writing for the four dissenters, ar-
gued that the trigger was not a restriction designed to equalize 
candidates, but a tool to efficiently allocate public funds to pre-
 
 51. Deborah Goldberg, Public Funding of Judicial Elections: The Roles of 
Judges and the Rules of Campaign Finance, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 95, 106 (2003). 
 52. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 16-952(A)-(B) (2011); FLA. STAT. § 106.355 
(2011); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 21-A, § 1125(9) (2011); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 1-19A-14 
(2011); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-278.67 (2011); WIS. STAT. § 11.512 (2011). Cities 
with trigger provisions that provide additional public funding include Albu-
querque, Chapel Hill, Los Angeles, and New Haven. ALBUQUERQUE, N.M., 
CHARTER OF THE CITY OF ALBUQUERQUE, art. XVI, § 16 (2010); CHAPEL HILL, 
N.C., GEN. CODE OF ORDINANCES§ 2-95(a)-(b) (2010); L.A., CAL., MUN. 
CODE§ 49.7.22(C)-(D) (2011); NEW HAVEN, CONN., CODE OF GEN. ORDINANC-
ES§ 2-825 (2011); see also Brief for Professors, supra note 3, at 7. 
 53. Chief Justice Roberts wrote the majority opinion joined by Justices 
Alito, Kennedy, Thomas, and Scalia, and Justice Kagan wrote the dissent and 
was joined by Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, and Sotomayor. Ariz. Free Enter. 
Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2812–13 (2011).  
 54. According to the majority, Arizona Free Enterprise was controlled by 
Davis v. FEC, which invalidated a federal “Millionaire’s Amendment” provi-
sion that trebled the individual contribution limit for federal candidates whose 
opponents spent more than $350,000 of their own money on their campaigns. 
Ariz. Free Enter., 131 S. Ct. at 2818 (“The logic of Davis largely controls our 
approach to this case.”) (citing Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 729 (2008)). 
 55. Ariz. Free Enter., 131 S. Ct. at 2825 (“[W]hen confronted with a choice 
between fighting corruption and equalizing speech, the drafters of the [trigger] 
provision chose the latter. . . . [The government has no] compelling state inter-
est in ‘leveling the playing field’ . . . .”). 
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vent corruption.56 Kagan recognized that the trigger simulta-
neously minimized waste in uncompetitive contests, and en-
couraged candidates to accept public financing by guaranteeing 
the additional funds when privately financed opponents spent 
more.57 To Kagan, the trigger made public financing workable, 
and public financing prevented corruption because it supplant-
ed the private cash that Kagan viewed as the source of political 
corruption.58 
The holding of Arizona Free Enterprise posed a thorny 
problem for public financing supporters. To retain public fi-
nancing’s traditional structure, public financing had to provide 
more money to competitive candidates. At the same time, in-
creased across-the-board funding to all candidates would likely 
waste money on uncompetitive elections and on candidates who 
have little popular support.  
II.  A PARTICIPATION THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCING   
Rather than respond to Arizona Free Enterprise with stop-
gap provisions that lure candidates back to conventional public 
financing, reformers should use the decision to transform the 
public financing paradigm. Public financing should no longer 
aim to purge all—or even most—private money from politics. 
Instead, it should encourage as many citizens as possible to 
participate in financing politics.59 
Throughout the United States, relatively few people make 
 
 56. Id. at 2831–32 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (observing that the trigger al-
lows states to motivate candidates to use public funding without resorting to 
overly large lump payments). 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 2830 (“By supplanting private cash in elections, public financing 
eliminates the source of political corruption.”); id. at 2841 (“When private con-
tributions fuel the political system, candidates may make corrupt bar-
gains. . . . And voters, seeing the dependence of candidates on large contribu-
tors (or on bundlers of smaller contributions), may lose faith that their 
representatives will serve the public’s interest. . . . Public financing addresses 
these dangers by minimizing the importance of private donors . . . .”); see also 
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 (1976) (per curiam) (“It cannot be gainsaid 
that public financing as a means of eliminating the improper influence of large 
private contributions furthers a significant governmental interest.”). 
 59. See Spencer Overton, The Participation Interest, 100 GEO. L.J. 1259 
(2012). While The Participation Interest introduces the state’s interest in facil-
itating financial participation in politics, this Article explains how convention-
al public financing undermined participation, why participation-based public 
financing is a proper government expenditure, the attributes and costs of mul-
tiple matching of contributions, and how multiple matching represents the fu-
ture of public financing after Arizona Free Enterprise. See id. 
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political contributions. While 64% of eligible Americans voted 
in the November 2008 election, only 10% typically give to polit-
ical campaigns,60 and less than 0.5% are responsible for the 
bulk of the money that politicians collect from individual con-
tributors.61 Just as civic norms encourage all citizens to vote, a 
key goal of public financing should be to encourage everyone to 
make a financial contribution to a political candidate or a cause 
of his or her choice. The bulk of campaign funds should come 
from a broader cross section of the population, and public fi-
nancing should facilitate widespread participation. 
This Part explains how past public financing approaches 
have suppressed participation. It then details why facilitating 
citizen participation through public financing is a proper func-
tion of government. 
A. PUBLIC FINANCING SHOULD PROVIDE INCENTIVES FOR 
CITIZEN PARTICIPATION RATHER THAN SUPPRESS IT 
Many advocates of traditional public financing programs 
have vilified private money in politics and have assumed that 
supplanting private money with public money would reduce 
corruption, increase equality, and enhance political competi-
tion.62 Unfortunately, this conventional approach to public fi-
nancing has often suppressed participation. 
For example, in Arizona Free Enterprise Justice Kagan ob-
served that “massive pools of private money” can corrupt our 
 
 60. See STEVEN J. ROSENSTONE & JOHN MARK HANSEN, MOBILIZATION, 
PARTICIPATION, AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 41–42 (1993) [hereinafter 
ROSENSTONE & HANSEN] (finding that between 1952 and 1990, in presidential 
election years, only 10% of the voting age population contributed money to 
parties or candidates); Stephen Ansolabehere et al., Why Is There So Little 
Money in U.S. Politics?, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 105, 108 (2003) (finding that dur-
ing the 2000 election, 10% of Americans over the age of eighteen gave to politi-
cal candidates, party committees, or political organizations). Because small 
contributions on the federal level and in many states and localities do not need 
to be individually itemized and disclosed, the exact number of contributions is 
unavailable but must be estimated through extrapolations of survey data.  
 61. In 2008, 0.44% of the adult population made a political contribution 
worth $200 or more. See Ctr. for Responsive Politics, Donor Demographics, 
OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/bigpicture/DonorDemographics 
.php?cycle=2008 ( last visited Feb.12, 2012). At the state level, a fraction of one 
percent of donors make contributions accounting for 80% of the money con-
tributed. See E-mail from Edwin Bender, Exec. Dir., Nat’l Inst. on Money in 
State Politics, to author (Mar. 7, 2011, 12:18 EST) (on file with author). 
 62. See, e.g., Jay Mandle, The Need for Judicial Public Financing, DE-
MOCRACY MATTERS (Feb. 2008), www.democracymatters.org/index.php?option 
=com_content&id=208. 
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political system, and “[b]y supplanting private cash in elec-
tions, public financing eliminates the source of political corrup-
tion.”63 Using public grants to supplant private contributors, 
however, suppresses expressive activity that poses no threat of 
corruption, such as $25, $50, and $100 grassroots contributions. 
To illustrate, Professor Richard Briffault—a leading public 
financing scholar—has asserted that public financing advances 
equality because “[m]oney from the public fisc comes from eve-
ryone and, thus, from no one in particular. . . . No one gains in-
fluence over the election through public funding.”64 Had Barack 
Obama participated in the public financing program for the 
2008 election, however, his campaign would not have been able 
to collect even a $5 contribution from a donor and would not 
have attracted an unprecedented 2.7 million small donors.65 In 
attempting to advance equality by ensuring that money comes 
from “no one in particular,” full public financing deadens citi-
zen participation. 
Briffault also argues that public financing is more likely to 
promote competition because flat grants are “not tied to a can-
didate’s success in raising private donations” and “place candi-
dates on an equal footing.”66 In trying to level the playing field 
 
 63. Ariz. Free Enter., 131 S. Ct. at 2830 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 64. Briffault, supra note 34, at 578. Many other reformers have pushed for 
equality. See, e.g., Edward B. Foley, Equal-Dollars-Per-Voter: A Constitutional 
Principle of Campaign Finance, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1204, 1215 (1994); Richard 
L. Hasen, Clipping Coupons for Democracy: An Egalitarian/Public Choice De-
fense of Campaign Finance Vouchers, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 27–28 (1996); Jamin 
Raskin & John Bonifaz, Equal Protection and the Wealth Primary, 11 YALE L. 
& POL’Y REV. 273, 279 (1993); Daniel P. Tokaji, The Obliteration of Equality in 
American Campaign Finance Law (And Why the Canadian Approach Is Supe-
rior) (Ohio St. Pub. Law Working Paper No. 140, Jan. 24, 2011). 
 65. Mark Schmitt, Can Money Be a Force For Good?, THE AMERICAN PRO-
SPECT (December 12, 2008), http://prospect.org/article/can-money-be-force-
good. While “clean money” programs require that candidates collect a fixed 
number of small contributions (e.g., ranging from $5 to $500) to qualify for 
public funds, candidates who qualify are thereafter prohibited from mobilizing 
even small donors. Indeed, the Campaign Finance Institute found that clean 
money candidates often raise small qualifying contributions from their previ-
ous large-dollar supporters, rather than bringing new people into the process. 
See Michael J. Malbin, Peter W. Brusoe & Brendan Glavin, Small Donors, Big 
Democracy: New York City’s Matching Funds as a Model for the Nation and 
States, 11 ELECTION L.J. 3, 19 (2012) (“Most [candidates] appear to have 
raised their needed qualifying funds by staying within their old circles of 
friends and supporters. As a result, the contributions did not bring many new 
people into the system or more economic and racial diversity among donor-
participants, where were said to be among the goals.”). 
 66. Briffault, supra note 34, at 569–73. But see U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABIL-
ITY OFFICE, GAO-10-390, CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM: EXPERIENCES OF TWO 
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among candidates, however, traditional reformers assume er-
roneously that democracy should not give a competitive ad-
vantage to candidates who mobilize more people to participate 
financially. Similarly, traditional reformers vilify “bundlers,”67 
but they fail to emphasize that many fundraisers are volunteer 
activists who mobilize participation of thousands of people in a 
way that candidates alone could never accomplish.68 
Private money is not always an evil that indebts politicians 
to a few special interests—it can also be a democratic good that 
allows citizens to hold politicians accountable. While traditional 
reformers would supplant as much private money as possible to 
eliminate the source of political corruption, the Court has rec-
ognized that money is an important tool to “hold officials ac-
countable to the people.”69 Traditional reformers assume that 
public financing is necessary to protect a candidate’s time from 
fundraising,70 but the need for candidates to collect contribu-
tions can prompt them to engage with constituents and can fa-
cilitate accountability. 
Traditional reformers are also wrong to attempt to purge 
private money from politics because studies show that financial 
participation is a gateway to other types of political participa-
tion. Small donors are more likely than non-donors and larger 
donors to volunteer to ask others to vote for a candidate (e.g., 
by staffing a phone bank or canvassing), to put up a candidate’s 
 
STATES THAT OFFERED FULL PUBLIC FUNDING FOR POLITICAL CANDIDATES 
41–44 (2010) (showing that, after full public financing in Maine and Arizona, 
the percentage of contested races increased only slightly, and incumbent 
reelection rates remained roughly unchanged).  
 67. See, e.g., Ariz. Free Enter., 131 S. Ct. at 2829 (Kagan, J., dissenting) 
(asserting that contribution limits are inadequate to prevent corruption be-
cause “[i]ndividuals who ‘bundle’ campaign contributions become indispensa-
ble to candidates in need of money”); Briffault, supra note 34, at 563 (stating 
that law would have negative consequences by “providing a major role 
for . . . bundlers”); Philip M. Nichols, The Perverse Effect of Campaign Contri-
bution Limits: Reducing the Allowable Amounts Increases the Likelihood of 
Corruption in the Federal Legislature, 48 AM. BUS. L.J. 77, 81 (2011) (suggesting 
that bundlers “work for or against businesses” and “offer bribes to legislators”). 
 68. Private money itself is bad to some traditional reformers, and thus 
these reformers fail to distinguish between an individual who makes a single 
$100,000 soft money contribution and an activist who raises $100,000 by mobi-
lizing 1000 people to give $100. As a matter of disclosure, the author served on 
the Obama National Finance Committee for the 2008 and 2012 presidential 
elections. 
 69. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 898 (2010). The five-Justice 
majority in Arizona Free Enterprise is identical to the five-Justice majority in 
Citizens United.  
 70. See infra notes 126–27 and accompanying text. 
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campaign signs, or to distribute literature in a public place, 
such as a county fair or election poll site.71 
Interviews suggest that political operatives also see a rela-
tionship between giving and other forms of participation.72 As a 
Campaign Finance Institute report states, “From the mobi-
lizer’s perspective, the underlying logic of the gateway sequence 
is a simple extension of the pervasive commercial sales practic-
es of cross-selling and up-selling, in which a firm attempts to 
persuade someone who has purchased one of its products to buy 
another, perhaps more expensive of its product [sic].”73 Politi-
cians and community organizers sometimes ask citizens for a 
nominal financial contribution not as a primary source of cam-
paign revenue, but as a step to help develop citizens’ invest-
ment in the campaign.74 Based on that relationship, the organ-
izers then motivate citizens to engage in other ways, such as 
volunteering. 
B. FACILITATING PARTICIPATION IS A PROPER USE OF PUBLIC 
RESOURCES 
Public financing skeptics are wrong to assert that govern-
ment has no role in political financing.  
 
 71. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. MALBIN ET AL., THE CFI SMALL DONOR PROJECT: 
AN OVERVIEW OF THE PROJECT AND A PRELIMINARY REPORT ON STATE LEGIS-
LATIVE CANDIDATES’ PERSPECTIVES ON DONORS AND VOLUNTEERS 28 (2007), 
available at http://www.cfinst.org/pdf/books-reports/CFI_Small-Donor_APSA 
-paper_2007.pdf (noting the estimates of the proportion of various types of do-
nors who helped campaign in ways beyond giving money); see also 
ROSENSTONE & HANSEN, supra note 60, at 170–78 (“[P]eople who give also be-
come the focus of other efforts to generate participation, for example, by dis-
cussing politics with neighbors, writing letters, and, most importantly, voting.”).  
 72. MALBIN ET AL., supra note 71, at 5–6 (showing how Ohio’s Delaware 
County Republican Party converted $75 contributors into phone banking or 
canvassing volunteers, and how national political strategist Karl Rove directed 
campaign staff to keep records of small donors to ask them to volunteer). 
 73. Id. at 6. Money may serve as an important gateway to nonfinancial 
participation because a small contribution may be a relatively easy way for 
some Americans to participate initially, as suggested by data indicating that 
many more people give money than time to politics. See sources cited supra 
note 71. 
 74. MALBIN ET AL., supra note 71, at 6–7, n.7 (explaining how an Iowa cit-
izens group used dues to get members vested and then mobilized the members 
for rallies and meetings with government officials); see also SIDNEY VERBA ET 
AL., VOICE AND EQUALITY: CIVIC VOLUNTEERISM IN AMERICAN POLITICS 367 
(1995) (“[T]aking part in politics probably enhances political interest, efficacy, 
and information; reciprocally, these political orientations surely have an im-
pact on participation.”).  
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Many skeptics of campaign finance reform argue not just 
for freedom from government restrictions on campaign contri-
butions and spending, but also for freedom from all government 
involvement in campaign funding.75 A leading skeptic, Bradley 
Smith, believes it is “dangerous to have the incumbent govern-
ment directly involved in shaping the quantity and substance of 
the very debate intended to determine how voters judge that 
government’s performance on election day.”76 
Granted, political debates will continue about the proper 
role of government spending and tax incentives in such varied 
areas as agriculture, housing, health care, military interven-
tion abroad, and education,77 as well as how government allo-
cates finite resources among these several areas. But providing 
the basic platform for citizen participation in democracy 
through properly crafted public financing is a worthwhile gov-
ernment function. 
Anti-public financing advocates fail to grapple with the re-
ality that the incomes of many citizens discourage politicians 
from even reaching out to mobilize them and render these citi-
zens less able to participate and hold politicians accountable. A 
lack of income chokes off financial political participation more 
than it hinders other forms of political participation.78 For ex-
 
 75. See, e.g., WILLIAM R. MAURER & DOMINIC DRAYE, FEDERALIST SOC’Y 
FOR LAW & PUB. POL’Y STUDIES, NEW FEDERAL INITIATIVES PROJECT: FAIR 
ELECTIONS NOW ACT 3–4 (2010); CTR. FOR COMPETITIVE POLITICS, FAIRLY 
FLAWED: ANALYSIS OF THE 2009 FAIR ELECTIONS NOW ACT 1, 28–30 (2009); 
Richard M. Esenberg, The Lonely Death of Public Campaign Financing, 33 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 283, 287–89 (2010) (arguing that current public fi-
nancing is “largely irrelevant” and that Davis v. FEC will put an end to most 
new public financing attempts); Bradley A. Smith, Some Problems with Tax-
payer-Funded Political Campaigns, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 594–96 (1999) 
[hereinafter Smith, Some Problems].  
 76. Bradley A. Smith, The Separation of Campaign and State, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 27, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/06/27/the-court 
-and-the-future-of-public-financing/the-courts-separation-of-campaign-and-state 
[hereinafter Smith, The Separation]. Public financing skeptics also argue that 
implicit in the U.S. Constitution is a “separation of campaign and state” prin-
ciple that government should have no role in subsidizing campaigns. For a dis-
cussion of this argument, see infra notes 162–69 and accompanying text.  
 77. ABRAHAM LINCOLN, LIFE AND WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN: EARLY 
SPEECHES, 1832–1856, at 215 (1907) (“The legitimate object of government is 
to do for a community of people whatever they need to have done, but cannot 
do at all, or cannot so well do, for themselves.”). 
 78. See VERBA ET AL., supra note 74, at 361 (discussing the importance of 
income). See generally ROSENSTONE & HANSEN, supra note 60. While wealth 
may also be a significant factor in the ability to make contributions, this Arti-
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ample, among those who are active in politics, people with little 
income give nearly as much time volunteering in politics as 
people with significant income—but income constraints deter-
mine who gives money.79 Of Americans living in families, indi-
viduals with families with incomes over $100,000 represented 
15.6% of the voting-age population in 200480 and cast 19.2% of 
the votes.81 Individuals with household incomes over $100,000 
were also responsible for approximately 80% of political contri-
butions over $200.82 
Participation rates are also low due to collective action 
problems in attracting smaller contributions from a broad 
group of middle- and lower-income Americans.83 Candidates 
face lower transaction costs in mobilizing larger contributions 
 
cle focuses on income because most of the data available examines the correla-
tion between income and political contributions.  
 79. VERBA ET AL., supra note 74, at 366 (“When it comes to making finan-
cial donations . . . the resource constraints of income are determinative even 
among those who are active and engaged in politics.”); id. at 361 (“[P]olitical 
interest has much less influence on contributions than on the other kinds of 
acts. . . . In comparison to other activists, contributors are—all else being 
equal—affluent but not especially engaged.”). 
 80. See KELLY HOLDER, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, 
VOTING AND REGISTRATION IN THE ELECTION OF NOVEMBER 2004, at 4, 10 
(2006), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2006pubs/p20-556.pdf (noting 
that the over-eighteen population of individuals in families with annual in-
comes over $100,000 was 24,025,000 and total population of individuals over 
eighteen in families was 161,927,000).  
 81. See id. at 4, 10 (noting that 81.3% of individuals in families with in-
comes over $100,000 voted, compared to just 48.3% of individuals in families 
with incomes less than $20,000). 
 82. See INST. FOR POLITICS, DEMOCRACY, & THE INTERNET, SMALL DONORS 
AND ONLINE GIVING: A STUDY OF DONORS TO THE 2004 PRESIDENTIAL CAM-
PAIGNS12 (2006), http://www.cfinst.org/pdf/federal/president/IPDI_SmallDonors 
.pdf (finding that 86% of the contributions over $200 in 2000 and 78% of such 
contributions in 2004 came from individuals with a household income over 
$100,000). Other studies have revealed similar findings. See VERBA ET AL., su-
pra note 74, at 193 (utilizing data from a period in which federal contributions 
were limited to $1000, and finding that “[t]he 3% of the sample with family 
incomes over $125,000 are responsible for 4% of the votes, 8% of the hours de-
voted to campaigning, and fully 35% of the money contributed”); John M. de 
Figueiredo & Elizabeth Garrett, Paying for Politics, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 591, 
614 (2005) (citing AM. POLITICAL SCI. ASS’N TASK FORCE ON INEQUALITY & 
AM. DEMOCRACY, AMERICAN DEMOCRACY IN AN AGE OF RISING INEQUALITY 7 
(2004), available at http://www.apsanet.org/imgtest/taskforcereport.pdf ) (“On-
ly 6% of people with incomes under $15,000 contribute to campaigns, contrast-
ed to 56% of those with incomes over $75,000.”).  
 83. See ROSENSTONE & HANSEN, supra note 60, at 21–23 (explaining the 
“paradox of participation”). 
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from a narrow group of higher-income Americans.84 Studies 
show that mobilization is a major factor in financial participa-
tion (people asked to give are much more likely to do so),85 and 
fundraisers find that they can raise more money by targeting 
personalized appeals to larger contributors. “Why should I call 
ten people and ask for $100 each,” many candidates and fund-
raisers ask, “when it takes me less time to call one person and 
ask for $1000?”86 While wholesale online solicitations are start-
ing to displace expensive direct-mail solicitations and to lower 
the transaction costs of raising money from smaller donors, da-
ta reveal that retail solicitation of large contributors continues 
to dominate fundraising.87 In the 2008 election cycle, for exam-
ple, candidates for the House of Representatives received al-
most four times more money from individuals who gave $1000 or 
more than they did from contributors who gave $200 or less.88 
Public financing critics also fail to address the fact that 
market forces alone will not sufficiently expand participation in 
the near future. Despite conventional wisdom about the emer-
gence of the Internet as a better means for small donors to con-
tribute, technology alone is unlikely to expand participation so 
that candidates are more responsive and accountable to a sig-
nificantly larger percentage of the population.89 Presidential 
 
 84. See id. at 30–33 (describing how strategies for targeted mobilization 
drives candidates to contact wealthier Americans). 
 85. See ROSENSTONE & HANSEN, supra note 60, at 36–37 (observing that 
“[t]he strategic choices of political leaders—their determinations of who and 
when to mobilize—determine the shape of political participation in America”); 
id. at 171 (finding that people who are contacted by a political party are al-
most twice as likely in presidential election cycles to contribute money than 
those not contacted); VERBA ET AL., supra note 74, at 137–38 (comparing spon-
taneous political activity to that which is done in response to a request, and 
finding that “[o]nly for contributors . . . is the proportion who acted spontane-
ously well under half ”); MALBIN ET AL., supra note 71, at 7 (discussing the cor-
relation between citizens being asked to donate and donating to a campaign). 
 86. See infra note 110 and accompanying text. 
 87. See, e.g., Michael J. Malbin et al., The Need for an Integrated Vision of 
Parties and Candidates: National Political Party Finances, 1999–2008, in THE 
STATE OF THE PARTIES: THE CHANGING ROLE OF CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN 
PARTIES 185, 198 (John C. Green & Daniel J. Coffey eds., 6th ed. 2011) 
(demonstrating the discrepancy between aggregate donations from large con-
tributions compared to small contributions in campaigns for the House of  
Representatives). 
 88. See id. The ratio was substantially similar for the 2003–04 and 2005–
06 elections. See id.  
 89. See Malbin, Brusoe & Glavin, supra note 65, at 4 (noting that technol-
ogy and the Internet has not, by itself, leveled the playing field between large 
and small donors); ANGELA MIGALLY & SUSAN LISS, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUS-
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candidate Barack Obama, who had more contributors than any 
American candidate in history and used technology in cutting-
edge ways for his time, received 69.5 million votes in the 2008 
general election but had around 3 million donors throughout 
the entire primary and general election process (including an 
estimated 2.5 million small donors).90 For more typical candi-
dates running for less visible offices, the rate of financial parti-
cipation is even lower.  
Public financing skeptics may suggest that less wealthy 
Americans participate by volunteering,91 but this discounts the 
value of financial participation. While non-financial participa-
tion is critical, financial participation is easier for many—more 
than five times as many people give only money to a candidate 
as those who give only time.92 Many wealthier individuals have 
limited time and may find it easier to participate through fi-
nancial contributions, and democratic participation is broad-
ened when less wealthy individuals enjoy a similar opportunity 
to make a meaningful financial contribution.93 Financial partic-
ipation is an important indicator of autonomy and self-
governance, regardless of income.94 
Identifying these challenges to participation and address-
ing them is a proper function of law. In the electoral context, 
government regularly provides the basic framework and tools 
 
TICE, SMALL DONOR MATCHING FUNDS: THE NYC ELECTION EXPERIENCE 24 
(2010) (“[T]echnology alone cannot unilaterally transform campaign fundrais-
ing.”). But see Richard L. Hasen, Political Equality, the Internet, and Campaign 
Finance Regulation, 6 FORUM 1 (2008), available at http://electionlawblog 
.org/archives/hasen-forum-final.pdf (“The effects of an expected deregulatory 
move by the Supreme Court, however, are somewhat blunted by the rise of the 
Internet, both as a means for the exchange of political information and for 
small-donor fundraising.”). 
 90. See Schmitt note 65; see also FED. ELECTION COMM’N, 2008 PRESIDEN-
TIAL POPULAR VOTE SUMMARY FOR ALL CANDIDATES LISTED ON AT LEAST ONE 
STATE BALLOT 5, http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2008/tables2008.pdf.  
 91. See MAURER & DRAYE, supra note 75, at 13 (observing that “there are 
other ways citizens can have influence in the political process besides contrib-
uting financially. Volunteers are a key component of almost every campaign.”).  
 92. VERBA ET AL., supra note 74, at 67 (indicating that of individuals who 
participate in politics, 69% limit their involvement to giving money, 19% give 
both time and money, and 12% give time but not money). 
 93. Professor Bradley Smith, who opposes campaign finance reform gen-
erally, has asserted that political contributions are democratizing because 
they give people who lack political skills an opportunity to influence politics. 
Bradley A. Smith, Money Talks: Speech, Corruption, Equality, and Campaign 
Finance, 86 GEO. L.J. 45, 94 (1997).  
 94. See id. at 48–55 (arguing that campaign donations are a form of free 
speech). 
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for participation.95 In the past, private parties provided ballots, 
private parties financed and regulated party primary election 
contests, and citizens who voted paid directly for the election 
infrastructure through their poll taxes.96 More recently, howev-
er, the state has provided a platform to facilitate participation 
by designing and providing ballots, funding and conducting the 
party primary election process, funding elections from the gen-
eral treasury rather than taxing voters, and offering other ave-
nues of participation such as voter registration services at De-
partment of Motor Vehicle offices.97 Public financing that 
facilitates participation is a part of this evolution. 
In Buckley v. Valeo, the Court upheld a public financing 
program that matched donations so that a $250 contribution 
would be worth $500 to presidential primary candidates.98 
While this one-to-one match was not as effective as the multi-
ple match proposed below, the Court noted the program fur-
thered pertinent First Amendment values because it was “a 
congressional effort, not to abridge, restrict, or censor speech, 
but rather to use public money to facilitate and enlarge public 
discussion and participation in the electoral process, goals vital 
to a self-governing people.”99 
Ronald Reagan—who criticized unnecessary government 
spending—not only accepted matching funds for contributions 
but benefitted more than any other candidate.100 Reagan mobi-
lized thousands of contributors and remains the “only candi-
 
 95. Benjamin D. Black, Note, Developments in the State Regulation of Ma-
jor and Minor Political Parties, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 109, 109–12 (1996) 
(providing an overview of ways legislatures and courts control political parties’ 
frameworks). 
 96. Briffault, supra note 34, at 583 (“[I]t is just as appropriate to use tax 
dollars to cover the costs of an election campaign as it is to use tax dollars to 
pay for preparing and producing ballots and collecting and tabulating the re-
sults.”); cf. Black, supra note 95, at 116. 
 97. See, e.g., National Voter Registration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 1973(gg) 
(2006). 
 98. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 85–86, 89–90, 107–08 (1976) (per 
curiam). 
 99. Id. at 92–93; see also id. at 93 n.127 (“Legislation to enhance the-
se First Amendment values is the rule, not the exception. Our statute books 
are replete with laws providing financial assistance to the exercise of free 
speech . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
 100. See Brief for Amici Curiae Anthony Corrado et al. in Support of Re-
spondents at 16–17, Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. 
Ct. 2806 (2011) (Nos. 10-238, 10-239), 2011 WL 661708. 
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date to ever reach the public funding primary campaign  
maximum.”101 
While government should not compel financial participa-
tion or equalize all citizen giving,102 policymakers should rec-
ognize that lack of income causes people not to participate, and 
should use the law to facilitate participation. 
III.  MULTIPLE MATCHING OF POLITICAL 
CONTRIBUTIONS   
Federal, state, and local lawmakers should adopt multiple 
matching fund programs that match the money a contributor 
gives to a candidate. The program should match the first $200 
of a political contribution at a six-to-one ratio,103 so that a $100 
contribution would be worth $700 to a candidate. Multiple 
matching funds would increase citizen participation,104 prevent 
corruption, make candidates more accountable to voters, and 
attract competitive candidates to public funding.105 Multiple 
matching funds are also cost-effective and constitutional.106 
A. MULTIPLE MATCHING FUNDS INCREASE PARTICIPATION 
Multiple matching programs increase participation, as 
demonstrated by the New York City program that matches the 
first $175 of a political contribution at a six-to-one ratio. In 
2009, the typical New York City Council candidate who partici-
pated in the multiple match program had twice as many con-
tributors and three times as many small contributors as the 
typical nonparticipating candidate.107 Seven times more New 
York City residents contributed to city candidates (the city had 
the multiple matching program) than contributed to state can-
 
 101. Id. (“But no candidate benefitted from public funding more than 
Ronald Reagan. . . . President Reagan remains the only candidate to ever 
reach the public funding primary campaign maximum.”).  
 102. See Overton, supra note 59, at 1282–88 (distinguishing equality from 
participation). 
 103. This $200 level is proposed in 2011 dollars, and it should be indexed to 
inflation.  
 104. See infra Part III.A. 
 105. See infra Part III.B. 
 106. See infra Part III.C. 
 107. MIGALLY & LISS, supra note 89, at 15. In 2009, matching fund partici-
pants included 93% of primary candidates, 66% of general election candidates, 
and 95% of those elected to city office (all but Mayor Bloomberg and two of the 
fifty-one City Council members participated). See id. at 10.  
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didates (the state lacked a matching program).108 Money at-
tributable to donors who gave $250 or less made up 65% of the 
money of City Council candidates who participated in the 
matching program (including public money), but only 17% of 
nonparticipating New York City Council candidates’ money, 
and only 7% of New York State candidates’ money.109 
Interviews with New York City candidates suggest that the 
matching program increased candidates’ incentives to reach out 
to more people. Former City Councilmember David Yassky ex-
plained the calculus from the perspective of a candidate: 
[W]ithout the multiple match, a $175 contribution is of marginal val-
ue to a campaign because it is simply too time intensive to seek out 
small donors. For example, I could make one phone call and ask for a 
$2,000 check, or I could make twenty calls to solicit $100 donations. 
The six-to-one multiple match turns $100 into $700, making it worth 
it to pursue small donors. Because there is no public financing system 
in place at the federal level, federal candidates are much less inter-
ested in $100 checks than are candidates in New York City  
elections.110 
Candidates also suggested that multiple matches increased 
contributors’ incentives to donate. Public Advocate Bill de 
Blasio explained: 
Even people who were not very interested in politics were energized 
by the possibility that they could play such a role in the campaign be-
 
 108. See Malbin, Brusoe & Glavin, supra note 65, at 12 tbl.4 (noting that 
0.22% of the New York City voting age population contributed to state elec-
tions in 2006, compared to 1.75% of the New York City voting age population 
contributing to city campaigns in 2009). This data refers to the 2006 New York 
State election, the last statewide election with comparable data, and the 2009 
New York City elections, the last city election with comparable data. See id. 
Five times more New York City residents contributed to candidates in the 
2005 city election than the 2006 state election (the city’s 2005 four-to-one 
match was less lucrative than its 2009 six-to-one ratio). Id. at 12–13. New 
York City has ninety-seven state officials that represent the city (including the 
Governor, Lt. Governor, Comptroller, and Attorney General (all statewide), 
and twenty-eight state senators and sixty-five state legislators with all or 
parts of their districts in the city), and fifty-nine city officials who represent 
the city (including Mayor, the Public Advocate, the Comptroller, five Borough 
Presidents, and fifty-one City Council candidates). See Elected Officials, 
NYC.GOV, http://www.nyc.gov/portal/site/nycgov/menuitem.36b1636466ec9207a 
62fa24601c789a0/index.jsp?cf01pg=1&cf01sz=10 ( last visited Aug. 21, 2011); 
Who Are Your Elected Officials?, N.Y. STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS, http:// 
nymap.elections.state.ny.us/nysboe/ ( last visited Aug. 21, 2011). 
 109. Malbin, Brusoe & Glavin, supra note 65, at 8 tbl.1. Among participat-
ing candidates, individual contributors under $250 accounted for more private 
money (37%) than contributors over $1000 (31%). Id. at 7 tbl.2. 
 110. MIGALLY & LISS, supra note 89, at 14 (citing interview by Angela 
Migally with David Yassky, Comm’r/Chair, N.Y.C. Taxi and Limousine Com-
mission, in N.Y.C., N.Y. (June 25, 2010)). 
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cause of the effect the multiplier had on their smaller contribution. 
When people who didn’t understand that there was a six-to-one match 
learned about the match, it was huge for them. Someone who would 
never have given $175 to a campaign would do it with the match. It 
empowered them by empowering their money.111 
The six-to-one multiple matching funds program stimu-
lates participation much more effectively than more modest 
one-to-one or two-to-one matches, perhaps because the more 
modest programs give candidates insufficient incentives to mo-
bilize smaller contributors.112 In New York City, for example, 
participation increased as lawmakers revised the program from 
a one-to-one match on the first $1000 contributed (in the 1989, 
1993, and 1997 elections), to a four-to-one match on the first 
$250 (in the 2001 and 2005 elections), and eventually to a six-
to-one match on the first $175 (in the 2009 election).113 Accord-
ing to the New York City Campaign Finance Board, the shift 
from the one-to-one ratio to the six-to-one ratio increased the 
 
 111. Id. at 12 (citing Telephone Interview by Elizabeth Daniel with Bill de 
Blasio, Public Advocate, in N.Y.C., N.Y. (May 18, 2010)). 
 112. Of existing matching fund systems, New York City’s program is likely 
the most successful because it provides “the largest matching ratio [six-to-one] 
on the lowest matchable amount [$175].” Id. at 4. These more modest matches 
may have also failed because they were limited to a few statewide elections 
like governor’s races. Thus, the programs did not spark an across-the-board 
culture of incentives for citizen participation in all state-level races. Further-
more, these statewide candidates possibly had less use for grassroots cam-
paigning than local or legislative candidates because their electorates were so 
large. In addition, in some jurisdictions (e.g., Maryland), spending limits on 
participating candidates were set at such low rates that few candidates partic-
ipated. GARRETT, supra note 37, at 36–44.  
 113. In 1997, contributions of $250 or less accounted for 54,456 total dona-
tions, comprising $4,228,040 and, with public funding, made up 30.8% of par-
ticipating candidates’ funds. E-mail from Ilona Kramer, N.Y.C. Campaign Fin. 
Bd., to author (Aug. 12, 2011, 09:33 EST) (on file with author). In 2001, there 
were 107,281 such donations for $11,241,506 and, with public financing, 55.1% 
of participating candidates’ funds. Id. In 2005, the number of such donations 
fell to 66,110, amounting to $7,180,067 and, with public financing, 49.7% of 
participating candidates’ funds. Id. In 2009, participation grew again with 
76,397 such donations for $6,806,183 or, with public financing, 54.4% of partic-
ipating candidates’ available funds. Id. Another examination of the data shows 
a slightly different but similar trend, with contributors of $250 or less (private 
and public money) accounting for 39% of participating candidate money in 
1997, 68% in 2001, 58% in 2003, 54% in 2005, and 64% in 2009. Malbin, 
Brusoe, & Glavin, supra note 65, at 8. The year 2001 was an outlier according 
to a New York City Campaign Finance Board official because it “was the first 
election with term limits and the increased matching rate. There were an un-
precedented number of open seats . . . and new candidates felt the ability to 
run without the incumbency factor and with the increased benefits of the 
matching funds program.” E-mail from Ilona Kramer, N.Y.C. Campaign Fin. 
Bd., to author (Aug. 12, 2011, 12:00 EST) (on file with author). 
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percentage of private money candidates received from small con-
tributors 33% percent, and increased the percentage of private 
and public funds attributable to small contributors by 76%.114 
The shift in ratio to six-to-one increased the yield on a $175 
contribution and lowered the cost of raising money from small-
er contributors. With a one-to-one match, raising a $175 contri-
bution (worth $350) was still much more expensive than raising 
a $1000 contribution (which also increased in value due to the 
match),115 because the yield on the $175 was not sufficiently 
high compared with the relatively fixed transaction costs asso-
ciated with all contributors (e.g., campaign resources required 
to identify, solicit, engage/entertain, and thank all contributors, 
and the administrative and legal compliance costs of each do-
nation). The six-to-one match, however, changed candidate be-
havior because it sufficiently increased the value of $175 con-
tributions (now worth $1225). Other relevant factors included 
the efficiencies candidates realized in being able to merge their 
fundraising operations and constituency outreach,116 and the 
relatively broad pool of people who could afford to give $175 
(which was much larger than the pool of potential $1000  
contributors).117 
B. OTHER POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
In addition to facilitating participation, multiple matching 
funds possess other attractive characteristics.  
Multiple matching funds reduce the potential for corrup-
tion. Consistent with Justice Kagan’s assumptions that private 
 
 114. The shift from the one-to-one to six-to-one match increased the per-
centage of private money candidates received from contributors of $250 or less 
from 14.4% up to 19.2%, and increased the percentage of private and public 
funds attributable to this group from 30.8% to 54.4%. E-mail from Ilona Kra-
mer, N.Y.C. Campaign Fin. Bd., to author (Aug. 12, 2011, 09:33 EST) (on file 
with author). 
 115. The one-to-one match on the first $1000 increased politicians’ incen-
tives to pursue larger contributors and ignore smaller contributors by doubling 
the disparity between a $175 contributor (worth $350) and a $1000 contributor 
(worth $2000). The six-to-one match on the first $175, however, does not in-
crease the raw dollar difference between the $175 contributor (worth $1225) 
and the $1000 contributor (worth $2050). The six-to-one ratio, however, does 
increase disparities between $175 contributors and those who contribute less. 
While this issue is inevitable with multiple matching funds, it is best ad-
dressed by adopting a high multiplier and a low matched amount.  
 116. See infra notes 127–28 and accompanying text.  
 117. These factors made it easier for many candidates to pursue two $175 
contributors (worth $2450 with multiple matching funds) than a single $1000 
contributor (worth $2050 with multiple matching funds). 
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money from large contributors and “bundlers” is suspect,118 
some conventional reformers might argue that the multiple 
match facilitates corruption by allowing bundlers and special-
interest groups to funnel matched contributions to favored poli-
ticians to influence the process.119 This reformer vision of de-
mocracy runs counter, however, to the Court’s observation in 
Citizens United that private money is an important tool to 
“hold officials accountable to the people.”120 Reformers should 
not aim to purge organization and mobilization from politics,121 
as these are key elements of participation. Multiple matching 
programs reduce the likelihood of a more commonly accepted 
definition of improper behavior—quid pro corruption—by di-
versifying a candidate’s support so that she is less beholden to 
a narrow group of large donors. 
In addition to helping to prevent corruption, multiple 
matching funds are more flexible and efficient than flat-grant 
programs. In rigidly distributing equal grants to different can-
didates in varied political races, flat-grant programs face the 
“Goldilocks Dilemma.”122 Generous flat-grant programs, for ex-
ample, often waste public funds on candidates who obtain little 
benefit from increased spending (e.g., unpopular candidates 
with no chance of winning, popular candidates with no chance 
of losing, and candidates in competitive but less expensive rac-
es). Frugal flat-grant programs with more stringent qualifica-
tion requirements may exclude promising new candidates, and 
frugal programs that give inadequate grants prompt stronger 
candidates to opt out of public financing.123 
 
 118. See supra note 58. 
 119. Jamin Raskin & John Bonifaz, The Constitutional Imperative and 
Practical Superiority of Democratically Financed Elections, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 
1160, 1171–72 (1994) (observing that in a privately financed system without 
income disparities, “the most anti-social and self-seeking factions could gain 
an advantage in government and use their power to win sweetheart contracts, 
tax breaks, and other government subsidies”). 
 120. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 898, 910 (2010). 
 121. Mark Schmitt, Mismatching Funds: How Small-Donor Democracy Can 
Save Campaign Finance Reform, DEMOCRACY: A J. OF IDEAS, Spring 2007, at 8, 
15, available at http://www.democracyjournal.org/pdf/4/008-020.schmitt.FINAL 
.pdf (“The campaign reform movement should first stop fighting organization 
itself.”).  
 122. Cf. Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct 
2806, 2832 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“The difficulty, then, is in finding the Gold-
ilocks solution—not too large, not too small, but just right.”). 
 123. Malbin, Brusoe & Glavin, supra note 65, at 20 (“If the threshold is set 
too low, public money will be wasted. If too high, the threshold will effectively 
become a barrier, defeating the goal of bringing new and potentially viable 
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Multiple matching fund programs largely avoid the Goldi-
locks Dilemma. The qualification threshold can be low to allow 
upstart candidates to participate, but candidates who do not at-
tract a significant following generally will not attract enough 
contributions that must be matched to drain the public treas-
ury.124 Further, because the spending limit is not tied to the 
public money allocated (as it is with full public financing), mul-
tiple matching programs that give each candidate a relatively 
modest total amount of matching money can attract candidates 
by relaxing or abolishing candidate spending limits.125 
Multiple matching programs also allow candidates to 
merge their fundraising operations and constituency outreach. 
Conventional reformers assert that traditional large-dollar 
fundraising hampers representation because it requires that 
candidates spend too much time away from their voting con-
stituents.126 Multiple matching funds encourage candidates to 
raise a greater portion of their money from their constituents, 
 
candidates into the system.”). A fixed program that gives an identical flat 
grant of $100,000 to all candidates running for state legislature, for example, 
can be both too generous for races in some districts and waste public money, 
and too frugal for others. Some have proposed addressing this problem by dis-
tributing public funds to political parties, and giving parties the discretion to 
allocate more public funds to their candidates in particular districts. See, e.g., 
Daniel Hays Lowenstein, On Campaign Finance Reform: The Root of All Evil 
Is Deeply Rooted, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV. 301, 351–54 (1989) (discussing a party 
allocation system of public financing). While this proposal eliminates waste, it 
does not facilitate citizen participation or work in party primaries.  
 124. Malbin, Brusoe & Glavin, supra note 65, at 20 (explaining that with 
matching funds “the qualification threshold can be set fairly 
low. . . . Candidates who do not develop significant constituencies are not like-
ly to get enough in matching funds to raise a fiscal concern anyway”). 
 125. Multiple matching programs could relax spending limits in one of sev-
eral ways: (1) set a relatively high spending limit tied to inflation; (2) exempt 
from spending limits all expenditures that derive from contributions of $200 or 
less; (3) exempt from spending limits publicly financed candidates when they 
are outspent by privately financed opponents (some interpretations of Arizona 
Free Enterprise may prohibit this); or (4) abolishing all spending limits for 
publicly financed candidates. For further discussion, see Spencer Overton, 
Ending Spending Limits in Public Financing for Campaigns (Sept. 29, 2011) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).  
 126. See Vincent Blasi, Free Speech and the Widening Gyre of Fund-
Raising: Why Campaign Spending Limits May Not Violate the First Amend-
ment After All, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1281, 1281 (1994) (asserting that the need 
to preserve the time of elected representatives for legislative duties justifies 
campaign finance reform); Briffault, supra note 34, at 583 (“Public funding can 
reduce the time and effort that all but independently wealthy candidates must 
currently devote to fundraising, thus enabling candidates to focus more on the 
voters and less on donors.”); Raskin & Bonifaz, supra note 119, at 1188 (“Time 
on the money trail is . . . time spent away from one’s voting constituents.”). 
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especially when such programs match only those contributions 
from residents of the candidate’s locality or state.127 These pro-
grams increase campaign efficiencies by allowing candidates to 
invest fewer resources in large-dollar fundraising operations, 
and by facilitating the conversion of networks of small donors 
into networks of community organizers.128 As four-term Bronx 
Borough President Fernando Ferrer stated: 
Because the match makes it effective for me to raise money in all 
communities, my fundraising activities do not diverge as much from 
my actual campaign as they would without the match. I am in contact 
with many of the same people, regular voters, both for regular cam-
paign purposes and fundraising purposes.129 
Proponents of traditional flat grants might assert that 
multiple matching funds favor incumbents, celebrities, and 
candidates tied to membership organizations such as unions 
and the NRA, and disadvantage political newcomers. 
Public financing should not be an equal-employment op-
portunity plan for candidates, but should increase citizen par-
ticipation. By focusing on citizens, multiple matching funds en-
courage candidates to mobilize a core group of supporters, raise 
funds from that group, and then use those resources to mobilize 
a broader group of supporters. Multiple matching funds reward 
candidates who are popular not simply among the affluent elite 
(who fund the bulk of our current campaigns), but also among a 
much larger population of citizens. 
Another complaint is that multiple matching funds amplify 
only the voices of those who have the resources to give,130 and 
that a voucher system would better minimize the impact of dis-
 
 127. For example, in New York City eligibility for public financing for bor-
ough presidents and city council members requires candidates for those offices 
to raise a certain number of matchable contributions from “residents of the 
borough,” and from residents “of the district in which the seat is to be filled,” 
respectively. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 3-703(2)(a) (2011). Once a candidate for 
these offices has met the eligibility requirement, the law restricts matchable 
contributions to contributions “made by a natural person resident in the city of 
New York.” N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 3-702(3) (2011).  
 128. MIGALLY & LISS, supra note 89, at 18 (indicating that “[u]nder the 
NYC [multiple matching] system, candidates are incentivized to build net-
works of small donors who become networks of organizers. The most cost-
effective fundraising and the most persuasive organizing takes place at the 
same spot: in supporters’ living rooms”).  
 129. Id. (citing Affidavit of Bronx Borough President Fernando Ferrer ¶ 4, 
City of New York v. N.Y. City C.F.B., No. 400550/01, (Feb. 12, 2001)). 
 130. Raskin & Bonifaz, supra note 64, at 332 (asserting that one-to-one 
matching funds on the first $200 use public money “to reinforce and to amplify 
the voice of those already wealthy enough to give” and “lock into place a fun-
damentally flawed regime in which private wealth continues to dominate”).  
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parities in income.131 One leading voucher program, for exam-
ple, would give each American $50 in “Patriot Dollars” to do-
nate to their favored candidates who participate in the program 
and agree not to accept other forms of private financing.132 
Although multiple matching funds will not overcome all 
barriers to participation, they advance different values and en-
joy advantages over vouchers. Vouchers promote mathematical 
equality, while multiple matching funds facilitate meaningful 
participation. By disqualifying candidates who accept and 
spend private money, vouchers are less likely to be used by 
candidates than multiple matching funds. Unlike vouchers, 
multiple matching programs allow donors to express the inten-
sity of their preferences by contributing more money. Multiple 
matching funds also make it easier for citizens to give contribu-
tions to multiple candidates, which is particularly helpful to 
less-visible, down-ballot candidates.  
Skeptics might also assert that ideological extremists on 
the far left and the right currently give the bulk of small con-
tributions, and multiple matching funds would enhance their 
polarizing influence on politics.133 Conservative Congresswom-
an Michele Bachmann, for example, raised 73% of her funds in 
2010 from small donors (more than any other member of Con-
gress).134 Multiple match programs that limit the match to con-
tributions from residents of a candidate’s locality or state would 
not accelerate polarization,135 however, as the bulk of ideologi-
cally charged contributions come from out-of-district residents 
(e.g., Bachmann’s 2010 congressional campaign raised 69% of 
its money from outside of Bachmann’s state136). 
 
 131. See BRUCE ACKERMAN & IAN AYRES, VOTING WITH DOLLARS: A NEW 
PARADIGM FOR CAMPAIGN FINANCE 43 (2002) (rejecting matching fund sys-
tems because Americans “should not be required to sacrifice private goods” to 
support candidates financially); see also Foley, supra note 64, at 1220–26 
(promoting vouchers); Hasen, supra note 64, at 18–27 (promoting a voucher 
program).  
 132. See Bruce Ackerman & Ian Ayres, ‘Patriot Dollars’ Put Money Where 
the Votes Are, L.A. TIMES, July 17, 2003, at B15.  
 133. Cf. Smith, Some Problems, supra note 75, at 601 (observing that “a 
number of fringe candidates have qualified for federal matching funds”). 
 134. Michele Bachmann, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/ 
politicians/summary.php?cid=N00027493#funds ( last visited Jan. 31, 2011). 
 135. For a discussion of New York City’s restrictions regarding in-district 
and city residents, see supra note 127 and accompanying text. 
 136. It is not possible to trace the origins of very small contributions as 
candidates are not required to include the addresses of contributors who give 
less than $200 in their reports to the FEC. 2 U.S.C. § 434(b)(3) (2006 & Supp. 
2010); see also, e.g., Michele Bachmann: Campaign Finance/Money—
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The cost of a multiple matching program is also reasona-
ble. In the 2009 election, the New York City matching program 
cost $27 million,137 or about $3.22 per resident once every four 
years.138 On an average annual basis, this represented 
0.00011% of New York City’s budget.139 New York City spends 
more on the Taxi and Limousine Commission,140 temporary 
services,141 and printing142 than it does on the multiple match  
program.143 
For a relatively insignificant cost, multiple matching funds 
facilitate widespread participation and engagement in a politi-
cal process that affects almost all citizens by determining the 
allocation of trillions of dollars in tax revenues and government 
expenditures. In the United States, the federal government 
alone collected an average of $7005.77 per resident in reve-
nue,144 and expended on average $2639.71 per resident on de-
 
Geography Data, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/politicians/ 
geog.php?cid=N00027493&cycle=2010 ( last visited Jan. 31, 2012) (noting that 
the calculation of in-state and out-of-state contributions includes only those 
contributions of more than $200). Even without the in-state provision, multi-
ple matching funds would not likely polarize politics. Without a match, ideolo-
gy motivates many small donors. Thus, the multiple match would likely 
prompt participation by a larger group of less ideological citizens.  
 137. N.Y.C. CAMPAIGN FIN. BD., NEW YORKERS MAKE THEIR VOICES 
HEARD 5 (2010), available at http://www.nyccfb.info/PDF/per/2009_PER/2009 
PostElectionReport.pdf. The 2005 election cost about $24 million. See N.Y.C. 
CAMPAIGN FIN. BD., PUBLIC DOLLARS FOR THE PUBLIC GOOD 74 (2006), avail-
able at http://www.nyccfb.info/PDF/per/2005_PER/2005_Post_Election_Report.pdf. 
 138. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, NEW YORK CITY, NEW YORK: ACS DEMO-
GRAPHIC AND HOUSING ESTIMATES1 (2009), available at http://www.nyc.gov/ 
html/dcp/pdf/census/nyc_boro_demo_06to09_acs.pdf (finding 8,391,881 N.Y.C. 
residents).  
 139. New York City’s Net Total Expense Budget for Fiscal Year 2010 in the 
City’s Adopted Budget was $59,479,863,786. CITY OF NEW YORK, ADOPTED 
BUDGET FISCAL YEAR 2010 i (2009), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/omb/ 
downloads/pdf/erc6_09.pdf. 
 140. Id. at 148E. 
 141. Id. at 5C (using as an example temporary secretarial services). 
 142. Id. at 4C. 
 143. Some may be concerned that multiple matching funds program re-
quire the creation of additional bureaucracy. While the Federal Election 
Commission has experience with a modest presidential primary matching 
fund program, many localities and states would need to establish a regulatory 
structure to administer matching funds. 
 144. In 2010, the government had receipts of $2163 billion. OFFICE OF 
MGMT. & BUDGET, FISCAL YEAR 2012 BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT 171 
(2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/budget/ 
fy2012/assets/budget.pdf. In 2010, the United States had an official population 
count of 308,745,538. U.S. Census Bureau Announces 2010 Census Population 
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fense,145 $2270.48 on Social Security,146 $2328.78 on Medicare 
and Medicaid,147 $1590.31 on non-defense discretionary spend-
ing (i.e., other executive branch and independent agencies),148 
and $634.83 on interest on the public debt.149 An annual ex-
penditure of $4.88 per person for multiple matching funds150 is 
a modest cost to ensure adequate input from—and accountabil-
ity to—a broad and diverse group of Americans, as well as to 
help prevent corruption and the appearance of corruption in 
the allocation of these resources.151 
 
Counts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Dec. 21, 2010), http://2010.census.gov/news/ 
releases/operations/cb10-cn93.html. 
 145. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 144, at 174 (showing ex-
penditures on discretionary security programs of $815 billion). 
 146. See id. (showing expenditures on Social Security of $701 billion). 
 147. See id. (showing expenditures on Medicare of $446 billion and Medi-
caid of $273 billion). 
 148. See id. (showing expenditures on discretionary non-security programs 
of $491 billion). 
 149. See id. (showing expenditures on interest of $196 billion). 
 150. This figure errs on the high side of possible costs, if Congress were to 
allocate enough funds to fully fund every federal election (including midterm 
elections) at the level of a presidential election, and not just provide a match. 
If Congress were to allocate $3.008 billion for the multiple match—the entire 
amount spent by candidates for federal office in the 2008 elections—then the 
annual cost per United States resident would be $4.88. See 2008 PRESIDEN-
TIAL CAMPAIGN FINANCIAL ACTIVITY SUMMARIZED: RECEIPTS NEARLY DOUBLE 
2004 TOTAL, FEC (June 8, 2009), http://www.fec.gov/press/press2009/ 
20090608PresStat.shtml (noting $84.1 million in public funds and $46.4 mil-
lion in private funds for John McCain’s legal and accounting expenses for gen-
eral election); Congressional Candidates Raised $1.42 Billion in 2007–08, FEC 
(Dec. 29, 2009), http://www.fec.gov/press/press2009/2009Dec29Cong/2009 
Dec29Cong.shtml (showing $1.38 billion in expenditures for House and Senate 
races in 2008 election); PRESIDENTIAL PRE-NOMINATION CAMPAIGN DIS-
BURSEMENTS DECEMBER 31, 2008, FEC (Dec. 31, 2008), http://www.fec.gov/ 
press/press2009/20090608Pres/3_2008PresPrimaryCmpgnDis.pdf (showing 
$1,497,977,843 in expenditures, including activity for Ralph Nader, Democrat-
ic and Republican primary candidates, and both primary and general election 
funds for President Obama); U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 144 (finding 
that the population of U.S. is 308,745,538). 
 151. Some suggest that contributions do not shape budgetary priorities. See 
MAURER & DRAYE, supra note 75, at 15 (asserting no connection exists be-
tween campaign contributions and political favors, that public financing will 
not reduce government spending, and suggesting that public financing may 
facilitate earmarks and pork barrel spending by elected officials who prioritize 
their constituents’ parochial interests over national interests). Others disagree, 
and assert that firms profit from contributions. See AM. FOR CAMPAIGN REFORM, 
MONEY IN POLITICS & GOVERNMENT WASTE (2010), available at http://www 
.acrreform.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/12/Fact-Sheet-Earmarks-Money-in-Politics1 
.pdf (observing that in 2008, the top ten recipients of defense industry ear-
marks each received an average of $13 in federal funds for every $1 they spent 
on contributions and lobbying expenditures). While demonstrating that cam-
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Multiple matching funds are also less expensive than con-
ventional full public financing. Unlike full public financing 
grants that supplant private money, multiple matching juris-
dictions provide only a portion of what is needed to run an elec-
tion, and this amount can be lowered if needed.152 For example, 
assuming it costs $100,000 to run a typical city council race, a 
jurisdiction could agree to give six-to-one matching funds on 
the first $200 of each contribution up to $25,000, $50,000, or 
$75,000 for each race.153 While the $75,000 level will likely en-
sure the greatest participation, the $25,000 level will also 
stimulate significant participation. 
Finally, sufficient protections exist to prevent the fraudu-
lent use of multiple matching funds. Critics might argue that a 
candidate could give $100 checks to 500 different people, have 
each of those people contribute $100 to the candidate’s cam-
paign, and receive a six-to-one match on the money collected—
turning $50,000 into $350,000.154 This type of fraud could be 
prosecuted under existing federal, state, and local anti-conduit 
laws that prohibit individuals from providing funds to others 
for the purpose of making a contribution.155 
Skeptics might also argue that candidates will waste public 
funds to stay in lavish hotels or build war chests for future 
 
paign contributions produce unwarranted expenditures or tax relief is beyond 
the scope of this Article, the allocation of tax burdens and spending priorities 
certainly warrants the engagement of the broad base of citizens that results 
from multiple matching funds.  
 152. The argument that multiple matching funds cost too much and rein-
force the participation of wealthier individuals could be addressed by limiting 
these programs to small contributions or less wealthy people. Such limitations 
would avoid subsidizing larger contributors who would have given regardless 
of the incentive, and would increase fundraisers’ incentives to mobilize smaller 
donors. Incentives available only to small donors, however, could be construed 
as discouraging larger contributions, and raise more constitutional concerns 
under Arizona Free Enterprise. See infra Part III.C for a discussion of consti-
tutional issues.  
 153. In the alternative, a jurisdiction could allocate a fixed amount of pub-
lic money, and allocate money to candidates on a first-come/first-serve basis 
until the money is depleted. This approach, however, may advantage early 
candidates and incumbents. 
 154. See gt, Thursday, September 23, 2010, SOAPBOX (Sept, 23, 2010, 5:33 
PM), http://ballots.blogspot.com/2010/09/recently-i-wrote-blog-post-about-how-to 
.html; MAURER & DRAYE, supra note 75, at 12 (quoting former FEC Chair Da-
vid Mason as saying “the presence of matching funds provides a dramatically 
increased incentive for conduit contributions”). 
 155. See, e.g., 2 U.S.C. § 441f (2006); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-907 (2006); 
TEX. ELEC. CODE. ANN.§ 253.001 (2010); FEC Contribution and Expenditure 
Limitations and Prohibitions, 11 C.F.R. § 110.4 (2011). 
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elections. Many public financing programs, however, contain 
provisions that limit the use of public money to specific cam-
paign-related expenses, require that leftover funds be returned 
to the government, and provide for repayment or even criminal 
prosecution for violations.156 Further, unlike conventional flat-
grant full public financing, candidates who contemplate a mis-
use of matching funds on unnecessary luxuries know they will 
be held accountable by past and potential contributors who 
have either already invested or are considering investing their 
personal funds to the campaign.  
C. MULTIPLE MATCHING FUNDS ARE CONSTITUTIONAL 
Multiple matching funds do not burden speech, and there-
fore the programs are not subject to heightened judicial scruti-
ny and do not pose the constitutional problems of the “trigger” 
provision invalidated in Arizona Free Enterprise.  
In Buckley v. Valeo, the Court upheld the constitutionality 
of matching funds (a one-to-one match on the first $250 of a 
contribution).157 The Court explicitly found that the program 
“furthers, not abridges, pertinent First Amendment values” be-
cause it was “a congressional effort, not to abridge, restrict, or 
censor speech, but rather to use public money to facilitate and 
enlarge public discussion and participation in the electoral pro-
cess, goals vital to a self-governing people.”158 Increasing the 
match to six-to-one does nothing to “abridge, restrict, or censor” 
speech, and more effectively furthers pertinent First Amend-
ment values Buckley referenced by multiplying the money 
available for public discussion and enhancing incentives for 
participation. 
Moreover, multiple matching funds for contributions do not 
violate the holding of Arizona Free Enterprise. Although the 
Supreme Court referred to the Arizona law it rendered uncon-
stitutional as a “matching funds scheme,” the Arizona law gave 
additional funds to publicly financed candidates to match the 
 
 156. See, e.g., N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE §§ 3-702(21), 3-704, 3-710 (2010) (defin-
ing “expenditure” and imposing audits and penalties for improperly spent 
funds and requiring repayment of excess funds); Fair Elections Now Act, H.R. 
1404, 112th Cong. §§ 103, 523, 534 (2011) ( limiting types of expenditures and 
requiring repayment of improperly spent funds while also allowing for crimi-
nal investigation). 
 157. 424 U.S. 1, 106, 143–44 (1976) (per curiam). 
 158. Id. at 92–93. 
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spending of privately financed candidates.159 Unlike the trigger 
provisions in Arizona Free Enterprise, multiple matching funds 
for contributions are not triggered by and do not respond to the 
spending of opposing candidates, independent expenditure 
groups, or contributors,160 and therefore they do not burden the 
speech of these entities.161 
Opponents might argue that the multiple match is uncon-
stitutional because it represents government burdening of un-
fettered speech. Just as the First Amendment provides for sep-
aration of church and state, opponents may argue, it also 
prohibits government from interfering with politics by subsidiz-
ing particular political actors.162 These opponents might refer-
ence the following language from Arizona Free Enterprise:  
[ I ]t is not legitimate for the government to attempt to equalize elec-
toral opportunities in this manner. And such basic intrusion by the 
government into the debate over who should govern goes to the heart 
of First Amendment values. . . . The First Amendment embodies our 
choice as a Nation that . . . the guiding principle is freedom—the “un-
fettered interchange of ideas”—not whatever the State may view as 
fair.163 
 
 159. Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 
2810 (2011). 
 160. The Court in Arizona Free Enterprise observed that unlike Arizona’s 
trigger, permissible government subsidies of speech did not directly respond to 
the speech of another. Id.at 2822 (“[N]one of those cases [upholding govern-
ment subsidies of speech] . . . involved a subsidy given in direct response to the 
political speech of another, to allow the recipient to counter that speech.”). 
 161. The New York City program provision that increases the spending 
limit and the match from six-to-one to 8.57-to-1 if a privately financed oppo-
nent spends over a particular amount, however, is likely unconstitutional un-
der Arizona Free Enterprise. See Larry Levy & Andrew Rafalaf, High Court’s 
Recent Decision on Public Matching Funds Renders New York City’s Campaign 
Finance System Ripe for Constitutional Attack, ALB. GOV’T L. REV. FIREPLACE 
(July 11, 2011, 05:46 PM), http://aglr.wordpress.com/2011/07/11/high-courts-recent 
-decision-on-public-matching-funds-renders-new-york-citys-campaign-finance 
-system-ripe-for-constitutional-attack-2/.  
 162. Smith, The Separation, supra note 76 (asserting that implicit in the 
U.S. Constitution is a “separation of campaign and state” principle that gov-
ernment should have no role in subsidizing campaigns). While the power of 
state and local governments to subsidize private industry (e.g., sporting are-
nas) is sometimes limited by state constitutions, these limitations usually ap-
ply only when a specific and identifiable private beneficiary exists rather than 
a broader group of beneficiaries, such as all citizens. Brent Bordson, Note, 
Public Sports Stadium Funding: Communities Being Held Hostage by Profes-
sional Sports Team Owners, 21 HAMLINE L. REV. 505, 508–09 (1998) (noting 
some state constitutional provisions require that public finances serve a “pub-
lic purpose”).  
 163. Ariz. Free Enter., 131 S. Ct. at 2826 (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14); cf. 
Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 742 (2008) (“Leveling electoral opportunities 
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These arguments are unpersuasive. First, as discussed 
above, dicta in Arizona Free Enterprise referenced a trigger 
that, unlike multiple matching of contributions, was deemed to 
deter speech.164 Further, the Buckley Court explicitly rejected a 
libertarian “separation of campaign and state” argument, hold-
ing that any analogy to separation of church and state was “pa-
tently inapplicable” because the Establishment Clause was in-
tended to prevent religious persecution, whereas the Speech 
Clause was intended to advance robust public debate.165 First 
Amendment text prohibiting the “establishment” of religion dif-
fers from text prohibiting Congress from “abridging” speech.166 
Multiple matching funds do not abridge speech but instead “use 
public money to facilitate and enlarge public discussion and 
participation in the electoral process . . . .”167 Congress possess-
es the power to provide financial support for speech,168 and it 
has properly done so in contexts as varied as public broadcast-
ing, educational media, preferential postal rates for newspa-
pers, and antitrust exemptions.169 
Multiple matching funds do not discriminate against larger 
contributors.170 Six-to-one matching funds on the first $200 of a 
 
means making and implementing judgments about which strengths should be 
permitted to contribute to the outcome of an election. . . . [I]t is a dangerous 
business for Congress to use the election laws to influence the voters’ choices.”). 
 164. See supra text accompanying note 160. 
 165. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 92–93 & n.127.  
 166. Id. at 92. 
 167. Id. at 92–93. 
 168. Id. at 90–91 (determining that Congress has the power to provide pub-
lic subsidies to politics due to its authority to regulate federal elections and to 
decide which expenditures will promote the general welfare). 
 169. Id. at 93 n.127.  
 170. Some might argue that multiple matching funds that subsidize only 
the contributions of in-district or in-state donors favor the speech of locals over 
others and constitute viewpoint discrimination. See MAURER & DRAYE, supra 
note 75, at 3 (“[R]elegating out-of-state contributions to second-class status 
undermines . . . the federal right to free speech and association . . . .”). This 
claim should fail. The in-district requirement would not prohibit out-of-district 
contributions, but simply would not subsidize them with public funds. The 
First Amendment allows government to allocate funds using neutral criteria 
that do not lend themselves to viewpoint-based discrimination. See Nat’l En-
dowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 614–15 (1998) (Souter, J., dis-
senting). Residency is a neutral factor unrelated to political party, ideology, or 
other viewpoint, and is utilized in a variety of electoral contexts (e.g., candi-
dates must often live in the district in which they run, petition signatures are 
often deemed valid only if they are of a resident of the district, and voting is 
generally limited to residents of a district). Furthermore, the viewpoints ex-
pressed by both out-of-district and in-district donors are often identical (e.g., 
support for the candidate), and thus the decision to match one donation and 
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contribution are available to all donors, large and small.171 The 
fact that matching funds match only the first $200 of a $1000 
donor’s contribution does not burden the larger contributor’s 
speech. 
Those challenging multiple matching funds may also argue 
that the program impermissibly restricts speech by decreasing 
the relative value of larger contributions.172 For example, with-
out the match, a $1000 contribution is worth five times as much 
as a $200 donation. With a six-to-one match on the first $200, 
however, a $1000 contribution (which works out to $2200) is 
worth only 1.57 times as much as a $200 contribution (which 
nets the candidate $1400). This extensive decrease in the value 
of larger contributions relative to smaller contributions, chal-
lengers might argue, fundamentally differs from the decrease 
that stems from the one-to-one match upheld in Buckley. 
Courts should reject this “relative value” burden argument. 
The argument requires difficult line-drawing exercises: Does a 
match become unconstitutional at two-to-one, three-to-one, or 
four-to-one? Further, interpreting diminishing relative value as 
a burden on speech would require invalidation of laws in vari-
ous other areas, including public broadcasting and government 
funding for the arts. Judicial invalidation of multiple matching 
funds would restrict the speech of smaller contributors in order 
 
not the other is not related to the expressive content of the donation. See 
Herschaft v. N.Y.C. Campaign Fin. Bd., 127 F. Supp. 2d 164, 168 (E.D.N.Y. 
2000) (noting that New York City “plainly has a substantial interest in ensur-
ing that public” matching funds are “given only to those candidates that have 
the requisite support within their district and that have received legitimate 
matchable contributions from New York City residents.”); see also Finley, 524 
U.S. at 596 (Scalia, J., concurring) (asserting that “[i]t is preposterous to 
equate the denial of taxpayer subsidy with measures ‘aimed at the suppres-
sion of ’ . . . speech” (emphasis omitted)). 
 171. Granted, multiple matching funds might change a prospective donor’s 
incentives to give the matched amount (e.g., a $200 contribution in a system 
that gives a six-to-one match on the first $200)—which may encourage some 
smaller donors to give more and larger donors to give less. Simple changing of 
incentives, however, does not constitute a burden or restraint on speech, as 
contributors are free to give more money, and no opposing spending or contri-
butions will be triggered by their decision to do so. 
 172. Opponents could also claim multiple matching funds discriminate 
based on wealth by increasing the relative influence of small donors in viola-
tion of the Equal Protection Clause. Multiple matching funds do not exclude 
larger donors, however, but allow them to take advantage of the multiple 
match on the first $200. Even in the unlikely event the multiple match is 
deemed a wealth-based classification, rational basis review (not heightened 
scrutiny) would apply, see San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 
1, 54–55 (1973), and the multiple match likely would be upheld.  
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to enhance the relative voice of larger contributors, which “is 
wholly foreign to the First Amendment.”173 
The argument that the multiple match burdens the speech 
of larger contributors is also flawed because the Court has held 
that contributions do not contain the same expressive value as 
expenditures.174 Thus, the Court has found that a contribution 
limit “involves little direct restraint on [a person’s] political 
communication, for it permits the symbolic expression of sup-
port evidenced by a contribution but does not in any way in-
fringe the contributor’s freedom to discuss candidates and is-
sues.”175 The multiple match is less problematic than a 
contribution limit, as the multiple match involves no restraint 
on the larger contributor’s political communication, but instead 
enhances it by applying the match. 
While some public finance opponents may suggest that any 
campaign finance rules that “level the playing field” are uncon-
stitutional,176 this equality rationale is prohibited only for laws 
that burden speech. Laws that burden speech are subject to 
heightened scrutiny, and the Court has indicated that preven-
tion of corruption and the appearance of corruption are the only 
permissible justifications for restricting political money.177 The 
Court has repeatedly invalidated campaign finance restrictions 
 
 173. Cf. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48–49 (1976) (per curiam) (“[T]he 
concept that government may restrict the speech of some elements of our soci-
ety in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the 
First Amendment . . . .”). 
 174. See id. at 20–21 (comparing expenditures to contributions, and observ-
ing that “[a] contribution serves as a general expression of support for the 
candidate and his views, but does not communicate the underlying basis for 
the support. The quantity of communication by the contributor does not in-
crease perceptibly with the size of his contribution, since the expression rests 
solely on the undifferentiated, symbolic act of contributing”). The triggers in-
validated in Davis and Arizona Free Enterprise were deemed to burden ex-
penditures, not contributions. 
 175. Id. at 21; accord Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 737 (2008) (“This Court 
has previously sustained the facial constitutionality of limits on discrete and 
aggregate individual contributions and on coordinated party expenditures.”). 
 176. See MAURER & DRAYE, supra note 75 (asserting the “Court has con-
demned regulations with the purpose of equalizing the opportunities for 
speech. . . . The only government interest . . . sufficiently compelling to support 
campaign finance rules is the prevention of corruption or the appearance of 
corruption.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 177. FEC v. Nat’l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 496–
97 (1985) (“We held in Buckley and reaffirmed in Citizens Against Rent Con-
trol that preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption are the only 
legitimate and compelling government interests . . . for restricting campaign 
finances.”). 
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designed to promote equality.178 Multiple matching of contribu-
tions does not burden speech, however, and conceptually the 
justification for the program need not be prevention of corrup-
tion but could include promoting equality.179 
To minimize litigation risk in the unlikely event a court 
characterizes multiple matching funds as a burden on speech; 
however, legislators should enact multiple matching funds to 
help prevent corruption, not to promote equality. Multiple 
matching programs prevent quid pro quo corruption by increas-
ing participation and diversifying a candidate’s support so she 
is less beholden to a narrow group of donors.180 Although level-
ing the playing field between average citizens and wealthy spe-
cial interests may be politically effective rhetoric, officials 
should avoid bill text, legislative record language, press releas-
es, website statements, and other language that suggests that a 
purpose of multiple matching funds is to equalize contributors 
or to diminish or dilute the influence of larger contributors. 
  CONCLUSION   
Public financing should no longer aim to purge private 
money from politics, but should instead encourage as many cit-
 
 178. Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 
2826 (2011) (stating that equalizing opportunities is “a dangerous enterprise 
and one that cannot justify burdening protected speech”); Davis, 554 U.S. at 
741 (stating that precedential cases “provide no support for the proposition 
that [equalizing candidates] is a legitimate government objective”); Buckley, 
424 U.S. at 54 (holding that the interest in equalizing the relative financial 
resources of candidates competing for elective office “is clearly not sufficient to 
justify the provision’s infringement of fundamental First Amendment rights”). 
 179. The Court referenced a similar rationale with approving language in 
Buckley. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 107 (“The thrust of [matching funds] is to 
reduce financial barriers and to enhance the importance of smaller contribu-
tions.” (footnote omitted)). 
 180. See supra text accompanying notes 69–71. One could assert that the 
primary anticorruption benefit of multiple matching funds is to reduce the 
possibility of corruption by supplanting large contributions with small contri-
butions and public money. The five Justices in the majority of Citizens United 
and Arizona Free Enterprise likely see monetary participation of all sizes as 
essential to hold politicians accountable to the people, however, and thus a 
“supplant large contributions” theory of prevention of corruption will likely fail 
to persuade a majority of justices. Indeed, such a theory may lead public fi-
nancing skeptics to characterize multiple matching funds as an attempt to re-
strain the speech of larger contributors that warrants heightened scrutiny. See 
MAURER & DRAYE, supra note 75, at 17–19 (characterizing the Fair Election 
Now Act’s goal of reducing the significance of large contributors as an attempt 
to silence these donors). For further discussion of how the multiple match pre-
vents corruption, see supra Part III.B.  
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izens as possible to participate in financing politics. Federal, 
state, and local lawmakers should transform their approach to 
public financing by adopting multiple matching of contribu-
tions. Multiple matching funds increase citizen participation, 
reduce the potential for corruption, and comply with the 
Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence. 
